#STRATDELA

TORRANCE, Calif. — September 14, 2026 — Castelion today announced a production delivery order from the U.S. Navy, with a total value of up to $200 million, to manufacture, assemble, test, and deliver an initial lot of Blackbeard Hypersonic Weapons to the fleet. Awarded by Portfolio Acquisition Executive Aviation (PAE(A)) through its Future Capability Development and Integration Aviation Rapid Capabilities Cell, these rounds will follow the 50 Early Operational Capability (EOC) weapons ordered in June of this year. Blackbeard’s rapid transition to production is a result of the U.S. Navy’s embrace of commercial innovation and private investment to accelerate carrier-based long-range hypersonic strike. https://www.castelion.com/news/blackbeard-200-million-production-order-us-navy/

https://x.com/NNSAWilliams/status/2099502851298902472

Inside Germany’s €3.4B Tomahawk missile plan – POLITICO https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-tomahawk-missile-typhon-launcher-plan/

This stuff is getting more and more relevant.

https://x.com/alexstubb/status/2099416428046700650

U.S. and international space leaders gathered in Tucson for the first Space Doctrine Conference Aug. 31 through Sept. 3, working to transform shared security requirements into partner-led space capabilities across the Western Hemisphere. Hosted by U.S. Space Forces Southern with the University of Arizona’s Kyl Institute for National Security, the conference brought together military leaders and representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, along with participants joining virtually from Chile, Uruguay, Angola and Nigeria. Representatives from the U.S. government, academia and commercial space industry also contributed expertise and resource perspectives. The four-day working-level engagement focused on three objectives: developing concepts for regional space Centers of Excellence, advancing partner-nation space doctrine and synchronizing future activities with national space development plans. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/573966/space-doctrine-conference-advances-multinational-space-cooperation

Inverting the triangle of power: The military–industrial complex after Silicon Valley - Antoine Bousquet, 2026 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/07255136261487204

At the East Gate campus, several facilities totaling approximately 845,000 square feet will add manufacturing capacity for next-generation aircraft, supporting production acceleration and scale-up of the B-21 Raider program. https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/events/b-21-east-gate-3-grand-opening

First, missile defense remains indispensable, and efforts to deploy a sovereign and cost-efficient ballistic and hypersonic missile defense capability should remain a top European priority. Second, interceptor scarcity, cost asymmetries, and difficulties with establishing comprehensive territorial coverage mean that a posture built on defense alone will fail against an adversary able to generate mass in the high-velocity missile domain. Europe therefore requires a complementary conventional counterstrike capability that credibly threatens calibrated retaliation. https://www.ifri.org/en/memos/confronting-russias-high-velocity-arsenal-european-challenges-and-solutions 🥲

🇷🇺 Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation on the agenda item 8 of the IAEA Board of Governors "Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT" 📍Vienna, September 10, 2026 💬 We are grateful to the Permanent Mission of China for its consistent efforts to promote, within the IAEA, an intergovernmental discussion on the AUKUS plans to transfer highly enriched uranium from the United Kingdom and the United States to Australia for use in the nuclear propulsion systems of submarines. It is clear to us that the “submarine” project of the three countries makes its own destructive contribution to undermining regional and global stability and has a negative impact on the international security environment. From open sources, we see that the United States, together with the United Kingdom, have embarked on the systematic military build-up of Australia. The US leadership openly speaks of increasing its military presence in Australia. In particular, this includes the deployment of a Submarine Rotational Force at HMAS Stirling, which has already received US nuclear-powered submarines on numerous occasions, as well as the forthcoming deployment to Australia of more than one thousand US military personnel to service US Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines. The Australian Government has announced a significant increase in defence spending — to 2.8% of GDP this year, with plans to raise it to 3% by 2033. In essence, the AUKUS “umbrella” envisages the concentration in Australia of offensive components of deterrence forces. All this raises serious questions as to Canberra’s commitment to the “letter and spirit” of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, and certainly does not contribute to achieving the goals of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which the countries involved claim to pursue. As for the aspects related to the IAEA, we do not dispute that any NPT State party has the right to pursue a nuclear-powered submarine programme, as well as to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. These activities are not prohibited by the Treaty. However, given that Article 14 of an IAEA safeguards agreement will be invoked for the first time, we consider it simply inappropriate that discussions on this matter with the Agency’s Secretariat are being conducted behind closed doors, without broad involvement of interested IAEA Member States. In other words, key issues concerning the development of new parameters for IAEA verification activities are simply bypassing the Agency’s policy-making organs, and members of the Board of Governors have no opportunity to make their views known in this process. This is not a normal situation. It appears that the AUKUS countries have already created an extremely negative precedent in this regard. <...> We have also taken note that, in the written version of his opening remarks at the opening of the session, the IAEA Director General noted that the Republic of Korea had formally notified the Agency of its intention to begin consultations under Article 14 of its safeguards agreement and, importantly, had fulfilled its obligations to provide information to the Secretariat. At the same time, we continue to bear in mind that the Republic of Korea is a participant in the US “extended deterrence” arrangements and is under the US “nuclear umbrella”. Seoul has been assigned a significant role in the planning of US strategic nuclear forces, and we are now witnessing its consistent expansion. We do not believe it is necessary to elaborate further on the implications, under these circumstances, of such a country launching a nuclear-powered submarine. We will continue to follow developments concerning this and other “submarine” projects, and call on both the countries involved and the IAEA Secretariat not to shy away from an open and inclusive discussion on this matter. 🔗 Read in full

Takeaways from CTBT 30th Anniversary discussion at Valdai Club yesterday: https://t.me/valdaiclub/17982

❗️If nuclear weapons aimed at Russia are deployed in Lithuania, the country's territory will become a target for Russian nuclear weapons, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

On an expanse of desert here between a Netflix studio and self-storage facility, construction is under way on a fusion plant meant to help America win an escalating nuclear-arms race. By the decade’s end, its developers say, the site will be home to a nuclear-fusion facility designed to subject weapons parts to the sorts of stresses they would experience in an all-out nuclear blast. Testing with fusion reactors helps ensure America’s nuclear weapons still work after decades in storage, components are reliable and that new designs will have the desired effect, without resuming the explosive nuclear tests of decades prior. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/nuclear-fusion-weapons-testing-china-russia-0b5fcfa9 https://archive.li/zqwl6

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced today that the Y-12 National Security Complex has completed production of the B61-13 Canned Subassemblies (CSAs) required to support the last production unit needs for the B61-13 program. ... “Our adversaries are rapidly modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals, so modernizing America’s stockpile has never been more urgent,” said NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams. “The Nuclear Security Enterprise is delivering critical capabilities at speed and strengthening the industrial capacity needed to stay ahead of evolving global threats. By executing our modernization programs ahead of schedule, we are strengthening America’s deterrent and supporting President Trump’s commitment to peace through strength.” In a two-stage thermonuclear weapon, the canned subassembly consists of the “secondary” stage capsule and other components sealed within a metal container. Together with the “primary,” the component is part of the weapon's nuclear explosive package. Following the conclusion of final verification activities, the final B61-13 CSA was diamond-stamped by NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Scott Pappano on September 1, certifying it as War Reserve quality and approved for use within the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Once completed at Y-12, subassemblies are shipped to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, for assembly into the B61‑13s, which are then delivered to the Department of War. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-completes-b61-13-canned-subassembly-production-y-12-seven-months-ahead-schedule

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi fears that the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries would inevitably lead to their use. “Just imagine for a second, if, with the current international circumstance, you had a world with 25 states having nuclear weapons or 18 countries having nuclear weapons, there would be nuclear weapon use for sure, 100% guaranteed,” he told Bloomberg in an interview. According to him, the growing number of conflicts, weakening security guarantees and shifting military and political dynamics are already prompting some countries to reconsider their decision to forgo nuclear weapons. Grossi described this prospect as “very disturbing” and stressed that “this is something we need to avoid at all costs.”

A separate 18-month contract that DiPippa said is worth “a few million dollars” will expand Auria’s Battlespace Operational Readiness Game, or BORG Space, an existing simulation platform used to teach orbital mechanics and rehearse military space operations. The contract is intended to test how BORG could be incorporated into a broader Space Force synthetic training environment, DiPippa said. Auria hopes that work eventually leads to an enterprise-wide training system. Versions of BORG are already used at the National Space Defense Center and the U.S. Air Force Academy. “We can do things like jamming and we can do things like offensive maneuvers in space,” DiPippa said. ... “Over here they learn orbital mechanics. Over here they learn delta V maneuvers,” DiPippa said. “Over here they learn how to do tasking and how to do resource management. Over here they learn how to optimize frequencies.” https://spacenews.com/space-force-turns-to-simulation-technology-to-prepare-for-warfare-in-orbit/

Stein, Lewis, and Lair argue that given the economic, industrial, and strategic costs, space-based interceptors are a poor choice for American security. They would provide an expensive yet brittle defense which could be easily circumvented while encouraging destabilizing adversary responses. https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/09/nothing-new-under-the-golden-dome-space-based-interceptors-in-the-trump-administration/

Indian nuclear weapons, 2026 - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists https://thebulletin.org/premium/2026-09/indian-nuclear-weapons-2026/

✅ Full recognition of space as a critical infrastructure and a pillar of European sovereignty. ✅ A dedicated and ambitious budget of at least €60 billion for space in the future European Competitiveness Fund. ✅ A European preference in institutional procurement for critical activities and technologies underpinning European strategic autonomy, applied where security, resilience and dependency concerns warrant it. European preference should not lead to the automatic exclusion of trusted third-country partners as long as the design authority remains under European control. While respecting these principles, cooperation with trusted third-country partners should remain possible where it strengthens European capabilities, interoperability, security of supply and reciprocal market access. ✅ Interoperability of space capabilities while preserving competitiveness and innovation. ✅ A regulatory framework that remains proportionate and oriented towards European industry's competitiveness. https://www.gifas.fr/en/news/gifas-bdli-and-aiad-issue-a-joint-statement-on-the-future-of-the-european-space-industry-6aa11746bf377

China and Russia have fielded systems capable of jamming, disabling or destroying satellites, while their own spacecraft provide targeting and communications for forces on the ground. Preparing for warfare in space therefore means more than keeping American satellites operating under attack. The Space Force is also developing ways to disrupt an adversary’s use of space and to get satellite-derived information to commanders and weapons quickly enough to affect a fight. Schiess is expected to continue the emphasis Saltzman placed on recasting the Space Force as a warfighting service. Saltzman spent much of his tenure arguing that guardians must be prepared not only to protect U.S. satellites but also to deny adversaries the space capabilities they would use against U.S. forces. Shaw expects Schiess to carry that message forward. ... While the NRO’s central mission remains national intelligence, the technology and acquisition machinery developed for that mission are becoming increasingly relevant to military operations. Mason described the relationship as essential and pointed to their work on moving-target tracking as a model for how the two organizations can combine their respective acquisition and operational strengths. ... The growth in military space spending is already drawing companies toward the defense market. “It’s absolutely a real trend: commercial firms are looking to defense markets,” Wilson said. That leaves Schiess, Hernandez-Baquero and Mason facing different versions of the same practical question. The national security space establishment has created new organizations, acquisition authorities and relationships with industry while arguing that the military needs substantially more capability in orbit. Now the resources are beginning to follow. https://spacenews.com/new-leaders-take-over-as-washington-bets-big-on-military-space/