🇷🇺 Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation on the agenda item 8 of the IAEA Board of Governors "Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT" 📍Vienna, September 10, 2026 💬 We are grateful to the Permanent Mission of China for its consistent efforts to promote, within the IAEA, an intergovernmental discussion on the AUKUS plans to transfer highly enriched uranium from the United Kingdom and the United States to Australia for use in the nuclear propulsion systems of submarines. It is clear to us that the “submarine” project of the three countries makes its own destructive contribution to undermining regional and global stability and has a negative impact on the international security environment. From open sources, we see that the United States, together with the United Kingdom, have embarked on the systematic military build-up of Australia. The US leadership openly speaks of increasing its military presence in Australia. In particular, this includes the deployment of a Submarine Rotational Force at HMAS Stirling, which has already received US nuclear-powered submarines on numerous occasions, as well as the forthcoming deployment to Australia of more than one thousand US military personnel to service US Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines. The Australian Government has announced a significant increase in defence spending — to 2.8% of GDP this year, with plans to raise it to 3% by 2033. In essence, the AUKUS “umbrella” envisages the concentration in Australia of offensive components of deterrence forces. All this raises serious questions as to Canberra’s commitment to the “letter and spirit” of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, and certainly does not contribute to achieving the goals of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which the countries involved claim to pursue. As for the aspects related to the IAEA, we do not dispute that any NPT State party has the right to pursue a nuclear-powered submarine programme, as well as to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. These activities are not prohibited by the Treaty. However, given that Article 14 of an IAEA safeguards agreement will be invoked for the first time, we consider it simply inappropriate that discussions on this matter with the Agency’s Secretariat are being conducted behind closed doors, without broad involvement of interested IAEA Member States. In other words, key issues concerning the development of new parameters for IAEA verification activities are simply bypassing the Agency’s policy-making organs, and members of the Board of Governors have no opportunity to make their views known in this process. This is not a normal situation. It appears that the AUKUS countries have already created an extremely negative precedent in this regard. <...> We have also taken note that, in the written version of his opening remarks at the opening of the session, the IAEA Director General noted that the Republic of Korea had formally notified the Agency of its intention to begin consultations under Article 14 of its safeguards agreement and, importantly, had fulfilled its obligations to provide information to the Secretariat. At the same time, we continue to bear in mind that the Republic of Korea is a participant in the US “extended deterrence” arrangements and is under the US “nuclear umbrella”. Seoul has been assigned a significant role in the planning of US strategic nuclear forces, and we are now witnessing its consistent expansion. We do not believe it is necessary to elaborate further on the implications, under these circumstances, of such a country launching a nuclear-powered submarine. We will continue to follow developments concerning this and other “submarine” projects, and call on both the countries involved and the IAEA Secretariat not to shy away from an open and inclusive discussion on this matter. 🔗 Read in full