#STRATDELA

China’s policy toward the United States remains stable and consistent, and China is ready to strengthen communication and cooperation with the United States, properly handle differences and sensitive issues, support each other in hosting the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting and the G20 Summit, and promote the constructive China‑U.S. relationship of strategic stability to deliver real results. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202611/t20261112_12058110.html

The Secretary and the Director recalled the bilateral leader-level commitment to a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity. They agreed on the importance of meaningful leader-level conversations to advance goals such as peace and denuclearization, including at any potential trilateral leaders meeting with Russia. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/11/secretary-rubios-call-with-chinas-director-of-the-office-of-the-ccp-central-foreign-affairs-commissionand-foreign-minister-wang/

Another silo-based loaded, likely Kozelsk. https://t.me/mod_russia/68945

For connoisseurs, full video of a session on space warfare during the INC-2026: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZTD3F9p5L8

❗️The European security system was central to talks, with mutual understanding reached on some issues, Russia's chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky stated.

French officials are anxious that Macron’s concept of “forward deterrence” means Moscow would hold Paris accountable for strikes conducted by partners. “If you invite someone into your house, you are responsible if they set it ablaze,” said one official with knowledge of the discussions. https://archive.li/sNSqn https://www.ft.com/content/7f61b561-bcbd-4900-afd7-553ff76d6217

https://thebulletin.org/premium/2026-11/israeli-nuclear-weapons-2026/

🎙Statement by Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A.Yu.MAZUR at the international round table “Militarization of Europe: What Next?” November 9, 2026 ▪️European arms control has become a victim of militarization; NATO lost interest in it 30 years ago. European arms control regimes have become victims of this trend. NATO countries began losing interest in them about 30 years ago, after Soviet troops were withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe, and the Warsaw Pact, and then the USSR, ceased to exist. Even the Adaptation Agreement to the CFE, which was agreed upon at Russia's initiative and signed in 1999, was never ratified by NATO member states. ▪️ Russia attempted to maintain arms control and de-escalation, but the West rejected all proposals. Russia made efforts to de-escalate tensions. However, these proposals were also rejected by the West. The US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty and the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO made Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the CFE inevitable. In early 2022, Russia was forced to launch the Special Military Operation to protect the peaceful population, and to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. ▪️ The West is sabotaging the Vienna Document and the "Structured Dialogue." The non-implementation of the Vienna Document by a number of participating States—Ukraine and certain NATO members—continues. They do not provide Russia with military information and do not invite our observers to exercises. Since 2022, this work has been scaled back by Western Chairpersonships, and meetings within the Informal Working Group on "Structured Dialogue" have been replaced by NATO-centric gatherings in "small groups" without Russia's participation. ▪️ "Escalation management" is an attempt by NATO to retain freedom of action in confrontation, not de-escalation. Lately, voices have been heard suggesting that it is time to consider how to use existing confidence-building mechanisms for "escalation management." Note that this is not about de-escalation (which requires addressing the root causes of confrontation) nor about preventing incidents and dangerous military activities (there are about a dozen and a half relevant agreements, but Western countries are not ready to conclude new ones, hold the annual military meetings provided for by these instruments to assess their implementation, or maintain channels for operational contacts through military attachés). "Escalation management" means an attempt by NATO and EU countries to retain freedom of action in a highly confrontational environment, counting on a restrained Russian reaction to Western provocations. It is not about de-escalation or preventing incidents. In closed formats, exercises are conducted to rehearse actions that would compel Russia to act exclusively within a Western scenario. ▪️ Militarization and arms control are incompatible. If one looks at the European experience of arms control, it was most successful during periods of transition from confrontation to cooperation, as measures supporting broader political agreements, and based on a certain level of mutual trust. Moving in the opposite direction is impossible because militarization and arms control are incompatible. By creating threats to Russia, European capitals are undermining stability, ultimately weakening their own security. The lack of orderly communication channels increases the risks of a crisis spiraling out of control. ▪️ Conditions are needed for dialogue: withdraw forces, stop provocations, and abandon the course of "strategic defeat" of Russia. Necessary conditions must be created for this, including ceasing attempts to "inflict strategic defeat on Russia", withdrawing foreign armed forces from our borders, and abandoning provocations. Our vision of such conditions is outlined in the draft agreements on security guarantees proposed by Russia to the US and NATO in 2021. Delegation on social media: 💙VK 💬Telegram 💬X 📺YouTube 📺Rutube 💬Facebook

The Air Force is looking to shift its Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile program from developmental test into operational test as soon as March, according to documents made public recently, inching the weapon closer to beginning rapid fielding in fiscal year 2027. Operational demonstrations associated with HACM are expected to start in March next year and last through September. https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/hacm-operational-tests-planned-march

The History, Law and Governance of NATO Nuclear Sharing

For connoisseurs, NASA Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance Best Practices Handbook: Volume 1 Volume 2

Interesting experiment: https://samuelfitoussi.com/posts/nuclear-button-benchmark

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/417417965_Fractional_Orbital_Bombardment_Systems

https://almauroni.substack.com/p/a-fairwell-to-the-nuclear-sea-launched

A German technology company is developing an “unlimited global range” space-to-ground weapon that could theoretically hit any target in Russia, The Times can reveal. Known as a precision orbital deep strike (Pods) system, it consists of a conventional projectile that would be launched from a satellite inside a shielded re-entry vehicle to prevent it from being burnt up by atmospheric friction as it drops. The “completely new and innovative capability” is being devised by Atmos Space Cargo, which is based next to the French border in southwestern Germany. ... It is also unclear whether a space-to-ground missile would prove technically viable or an economically reasonable alternative to orthodox deep-strike weapons. One military source noted that its flight path might be comparatively easy for enemy states to detect and track. https://archive.li/3s11e https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/europe-space-missile-russia-fmzqx8ghn

Honored by this comic strip. https://t.me/kargo_comix_zone/112

For the first time in 20 years, the United States can once again produce a specialized material used in U.S. nuclear weapons, marking a major step toward the modernization of the nuclear stockpile. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has qualified the Y-12 National Security Complex to resume production of a material known as “binary” alloy, ending two decades of reliance on a limited supply of material manufactured years ago. Binary alloy is used to manufacture radiation cases, which enclose essential components within America’s nuclear weapons. Restoring the ability to produce this material gives the United States a renewed source for maintaining and modernizing its nuclear stockpile. “Under the Trump Administration, NNSA is making sweeping investments to revitalize the nation’s nuclear weapons infrastructure,” said NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams. “This is not just about a warhead ingredient. This shift symbolizes our commitment to the long-term health of our weapons stockpile and the lasting security of our country.” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/us-restores-key-nuclear-weapons-manufacturing-capability-after-20-years

The Dongfeng-61's transition from its public debut in a military parade to routine training has been far faster than the traditional combat capability generation cycle of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Firstly, this indicates that it had already completed development, finalization, trial installation, and reliability verification before its public debut, demonstrating a high level of technological maturity. Secondly, it reflects the Rocket Force's mature equipment support and training system. The Dongfeng-61 is compatible with existing command, communication, and support links. Leveraging the Rocket Force's long-standing experience in intercontinental ballistic missile training, troops can quickly master the new equipment after receiving it, shortening the combat capability generation cycle and reflecting the significant achievements of the Rocket Force's "nuclear and conventional capability, all-domain deterrence and combat" construction after the reforms. The Dongfeng-61's routine training signifies its entry into realistic combat training exercises such as field maneuvering, site conversion, and launch procedures, enriching my country's land-based nuclear counterattack capabilities, mobile survivability, and penetration strike capabilities. https://news.cctv.com/2026/11/05/ARTIf225lf6ktvBvjWannYEp261105.shtml [Automatic translation]

The Space Force, in “partnership” with the Pentagon’s Golden Dome office, has tapped Viasat to build a Missions Operation Center (MOC) to integrate multiple satellite constellations and manage data traffic through the nascent Space Data Network (SDN) Backbone, the service announced. The company has been awarded an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract with a ceiling of $450 million to “design, field, and scale” the center, Space Systems Command said in a Thursday press release. “In this role, Viasat, Inc. will serve as the network and mission system integration partner as SSC expands its open-architecture ecosystem across multiple space-segment providers.” The MOC will serve as the central network orchestration hub for the SDN Backbone, a constellation of low Earth orbit satellites being built by SpaceX to provide high-speed, low-latency communications. The backbone constellation is designed as the glue connecting the Space Data Network’s broader architecture of disparate military, and eventually commercial, space-based sensor and communications satellites with decision-makers and weapons platforms. The network’s near-term focus will be on supporting the Trump administration’s Golden Dome missile defense initiative. ... According to the release, the MOC will provide the SDN Backbone with: Multi-Vendor Orchestration: Integrates disparate satellite systems into a unified communications network. Multi-Domain Joint Connectivity: Supports high-speed, low-latency, and cyber-resilient data paths for users across air, land, sea, and space. Real-Time Priority Routing: Enables dynamic data management and routing based on mission priorities through network operations infrastructure. https://breakingdefense.com/2026/11/dod-taps-viasat-to-field-operations-center-for-golden-dome-satellite-data-relay-network/

The infrastructure supporting NATO’s nuclear strike mission is shifting north to include significantly more active nuclear weapons storage shelters than in the southern part of the Alliance. The shift is visible on new satellite images showing the full extent of construction of security fencing around 22 nuclear-capable aircraft shelters at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath, the home of the U.S. Air Force 48th Fighter Wing. The northern nuclear focus will increase further when the United Kingdom buys 12 U.S. F-35A fighter-bombers for deployment at RAF Marham as a new part of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear sharing mission, as announced in 2025. https://fas.org/publication/extent-of-new-construction-at-raf-lakenheath/