Suriyakmaps

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1669-1675: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Kupiansk front: The situation south of Kupiansk remains deadlocked for Russian army. Unable to eliminate the last pockets of Ukrainian resistance on the eastern bank of the Oskil, it is the Ukrainian forces that are now attempting to regain the initiative there. During the last three weeks, Ukrainian army has managed to recapture a series of positions north-east of Hlushkivka and advance towards Tabaivka, amidst fighting with Russian troops. Further north, Ukrainian troops continue to cross the Oskil, prolonging the battle for Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, which has been ongoing since early July, where fighting has returned to the vicinity of the Kupyansk railway carriage depot. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=49.64227771073116%2C37.695920213151304&z=11 ]

From the north, Russians have taken control of Krasnyi Yar and the Khyzhnyakove forest, whilst from the east they have recaptured Ustynivka, captured Shyroke and are carrying out infiltrations into Potykhonove, suggesting that the Ukrainian garrison in the village of Rublene (if it still exists) is at risk of being surrounded. From the south-east, Russian troops managed to repel the Ukrainian counter-attack in Ivashchyne, Anyshchyne and Vodyane and launched new operations towards Dovzhanka, where fighting continues. Meanwhile, Ukrainian army managed to repel the Russian advance from Milove and recapture some positions there. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=50.279672557138404%2C37.19230088247742&z=10 ]

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1669-1675: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Volchanska & Vilkhuvatska fronts: Russian army has continued to shrink the ‘cauldron’ north of Velykyi Burluk over the past week. From the west, after securing Zakharivka, Russian forces cleared the forest where the settlement of Buzovo-Vtoroye once stood, near the present-day village of Buzovo. There are reports of the capture of Lozova and Petropavlivka, but there is as yet no confirmation from the ground, where fighting is still taking place some distance away.

Reports that RSF is withdrawing from Blue Nile governorate towards Ethiopian territory in order to be redeployed to Darfur. 🇵🇸🇪🇹

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1669-1675: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Hlukhiv front: During the last three weeks, Russian army has continued to consolidate its positions in the centre of the locality of Ulanove following low-intensity positional attacks. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=51.783710703942724%2C34.29199015967088&z=11 ]

Pro-Ukrainian accounts are touting the recapture of Lyman as a major victory. But there are no images, so they have to resort to videos from 2022 to make the narrative add up. The reason for this is that, unlike in 2022—when the town was recaptured following a counteroffensive in early fall—in 2026 there has been no counteroffensive (as there was on the Nitrius River salient); rather, the Ukrainian victory was due to Russia’s failure to take the town after months of assault and infiltration operations (which intensified in June and July). In this case, Lyman never fell, so it could not be recaptured. 🇺🇦🇷🇺

For those interested in Ethiopian war map: https://t.me/johnboltonstan/15697

I’m not going to create a map of Ethiopia 🇪🇹 unless I want to drive myself mad. But I would like to point out that the resumption of war in that country will seriously harm the RSF in Sudan 🇸🇩, which will be deprived of one of its local allies – without whom it would not have been able to hold out for so long in the governorates of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The RSF risk losing Northern Kordofan entirely, and if this is compounded by a collapse in the south, it will open a window of opportunity for the SAF to launch a powerful offensive westwards and reach the most important rebel strongholds.

The economic crisis is also seriously affecting the Druze, despite them not being under siege like their counterparts in Suwayda, and this has sparked criticism of the Syrian Transitional Government for failing to prevent the Israeli occupation of the territory and for abandoning its inhabitants – criticism that stems from the same roots as that voiced by the Arab population of Quneitra and Daraa. Furthermore, these images also appear to confirm that the Druze have begun to collaborate with the Syrian resistance (IRFS) in their struggle against the Israeli occupation, which extends across much of their land. In truth, collaboration between the resistance and the Druze is nothing new. In July 2025, the IRSF took part in the defence of Suwayda against the terrorist invasion and, in the months since then, has continued its activities in Suwayda itself in an attempt to reduce al-Hijri’s influence over the Druze militias (there is, in fact, a covert struggle between nationalist Druze and pro-independence Druze). Despite this, the incorporation of Western Druze into the resistance (abandoned by the authorities and under continuous foreign occupation) is likely to be less costly than that of the Eastern Druze, who are more likely to reject any attempt at rapprochement with Damascus, particularly following the massacres of July 2025. It would also be an achievement to bring on board the Druze of the occupied Golan Heights, who were historically in favour of ending the Israeli occupation of this territory until the change of the Syrian political regime. The question is how the STG will react and how this will affect the already fragile relationship between it and the Druze, particularly if operations are carried out in collaboration with Tel Aviv to dismantle resistance cells, as happened in Quneitra and Daraa in recent months. Losing the ‘support’ – or rather, the silence – of the Western Druze will further undermine the transitional government’s attempt to control Syria’s southern border, whilst Israel continues to arm the pro-independence Druze of al-Hijri and prepares for a future major campaign in Syria, and whilst the resistance continues to gain supporters amongst those who once backed the Syrian rebels.

In fact, when discussing the Druze in Syria, the focus is always on Suwayda, as it is the governorate with the largest Druze population, but this tends to overlook the communities on Mount Hermon, in the Damascus countryside and in Quneitra. Unlike what happened in Suwayda, the Druze communities in these regions are under the nominal control of the STG and have not suffered massacres at the hands of terrorist groups affiliated with Damascus. This is not to say that there is no uncertainty or tension; everything is kept in check by a tacit agreement of political passivity between the local population and the authorities. However, this passivity has also led to Israeli patrols being permitted in the Druze villages since early 2025, which is preventing these communities from properly recovering from the war.

The Syrian Druze & Syrian resistance. On 24 September 2026, the IDF spokesperson announced the results of operations carried out by the IDF’s 228th Brigade in the newly occupied Syrian territory. Among the images of the confiscated weaponry were insignia of the Druze flag, which casts doubt on the narrative of unconditional Druze support for Israel put forward by the STG and al-Hijri’s supporters.

This so-called security campaign is nothing more than the result of cheap deals and agreements offered as a “security gift” to the head of the enemy Zionist government, Netanyahu, to strengthen his political position. Its main objective is to eliminate any element of resistance in the region and secure the enemy’s border zone. The most notable features of this threat manifest in two dangerous courses of action: arrest campaigns and the fabrication of charges through the widespread and systematic persecution of the region’s youth, spreading arbitrary and pre-fabricated accusations ranging from affiliation with “Ulu al-Ass” (a term used to refer to armed groups) to ISIS, to justify raids, arrests, and torture; and on-the-ground searches and sieges, through the deployment of specialized security units accompanied by K9 police dogs to comb through villages and farms, confiscating any individual or defensive weapons that could be used in the future against the Zionist enemy. In light of these imminent risks, we urge everyone to immediately and rigorously adopt the following preventive and procedural measures. Digital and cyber security: Conduct a complete and thorough scan of all literature, images, and conversations of an Islamic or resistance nature on phones and smart devices. On-the-ground precautions and movement restrictions: Avoid unnecessary travel on roads connecting towns and villages from late afternoon until early morning to avoid falling into sudden ambushes and mobile checkpoints. Ensuring Safety in Towns and Villages: Immediately close businesses and disperse gatherings of young people in public squares and cafes upon receiving news of the movement of convoys or security patrols, and remain in your homes to avoid arbitrary arrests. Destruction of Documents: Immediately destroy any document, letter, or written instruction that could serve as grounds for a conviction or arrest during surprise home raids. Counter-security and the fight against espionage: Immediately provide the Front, through the official contact person, with the names and details of all those who have been proven to be involved in drafting reports or providing information on behalf of the security services or the Zionist entity, for the internal traitor is more dangerous and criminal than the external enemy. We urge all young people to exercise extreme caution and vigilance, and to join forces to thwart this plan. God is the protector of the weak Islamic Resistance Front in Syria I am brave General Command September 18, 2026

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria - The Strongest General Command September 18, 2026: In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful Those to whom the people said, “Indeed, the people have gathered against you, so fear them.” But this only increased their faith, and they said, “God is sufficient for us, and He is the best Protector.” To our faithful popular base and our free youth in the proud south of Syria. Based on cross-referenced intelligence and reliable security data received by our central operations room, we warn our people throughout southern Syria—specifically in the Quneitra Governorate and the western rural areas of Daraa—of imminent security operations and a large-scale search-and-raid operation being prepared by security services affiliated with the Damascus regime in the coming days.

Sudan Civil War: [25/9/2026]: 🇸🇩 Situation on Kordofan front: Over the past six days, the SAF have continued their operations in the desert areas, accelerating the RSF’s retreat towards the south and west. As a result of the latest operations, on 25 September government forces took control of the town of Sawdiri, the last rebel stronghold in North Kordofan Governorate. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=19IxdgUFhNYyUIXEkYmQgmaYHz6OTMEk&ll=14.33335889879597%2C29.891842206616104&z=9 ]

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The Russian presence in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is at risk of disappearing. 🇺🇦🇷🇺 The blocking of Starlink and the shortage of troops in the Vostok Group (due to the redeployment of troops to other fronts) have led to a decline in Russian territorial control in that oblast from 420 square kilometers in early January to just 70 square kilometers by the end of September. This has pushed the fighting back to the borders of the Donetsk front and even several kilometers further inland, jeopardizing positions captured by the Russians in the first half of 2025. It would not be surprising if the Russian presence (understood as solid control) were to end soon. As I mentioned in June, the countermeasures to resolve the Starlink blockade would last until the end of the year, so there are at least three difficult months ahead for the Russian armed forces in the south (even despite the advances in Orikhiv).

Dibrova and Ozerne have also been fully recaptured by Ukrainian forces, while infiltrations continue in Yampil and in the forests of Sviati Hory National Park, with the aim of reaching the Zherebets River from that flank and approaching Tors'ke from the south (by crossing the river).🇺🇦🇷🇺

Lyman still has a small presence of Russian troops in the Masliakivka suburb but Nikolaevka was completely secured by Ukrainian Army after the elimination of Russian infiltrations in the last two & a half weeks. Yesterday I discussed the problem of the accumulation of Ukrainian local successes for the Russians, and this is now happening as these successes spread to both banks of the Donets River. It’s no longer just that the loss of Lyman is hindering the progress of the Russian operation to take Sloviansk; rather, the very momentum behind the Russian assault on the city from the east has vanished (though the same cannot yet be said of Kramatorsk, at least for now). 🇺🇦🇷🇺

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And by that, for example, they are referring to Komar, where the situation is very unfavourable for the Russians; they may well lose the town in the coming weeks unless reinforcements arrive.