Suriyakmaps

Not exactly, Novoandriivka remains under Russian control, the post is related with the salient north of it that Anatoly still showing in red.

P.S. - Suriyak posted this because of Anatoly drawing this:

I understand that Russia remains committed to prolonging the war of attrition at the cost of fewer casualties and even further territorial losses, but time continues to take its toll on troop morale and public support for the war. Losing the Lyman salient has not been particularly costly for Russia, as it ordered a swift withdrawal, and it is highly likely that the Ukrainian advance will be halted at Zherebets; the issue is the impact on the morale of troops who have seen almost a year’s work undone in a matter of weeks, without noticing any substantial change in the dynamics of the war. This is compounded by the lack of reinforcements on certain fronts, the failure to implement countermeasures, and the absence of intensified attacks on the Ukrainian rear. The disaster of 2022 will not be repeated, but neither do the advances of 2024–2025 seem likely to be, unless Moscow decides to take more radical measures to accelerate the deterioration of the Ukrainian armed forces – something that could be carried out now that the Russian parliamentary elections have concluded. Local setbacks are not a cause for concern at present, but their accumulation will eventually take its toll on Russian morale and, consequently, on the conduct of military operations, which could lead to a genuine stalemate on the front by 2027.🇷🇺🇺🇦

Ukrainian reinforcements arriving in the Orikhiv area have launched local counter-attacks in recent days, successfully eliminating the Russian ‘salient’ at Novopavlivka, which has brought Russian operations to capture this locality to a standstill. These Ukrainian counter-attacks are also having an impact on the Vasylivka front, where Ukrainian forces are attempting to push the front line back to the Shcherbaky–Stepove line. 🇺🇦🇷🇺

Despite the propaganda about economic recovery & improved security in Syria, the reality is quite different… and harsh. 🇸🇾 Contrary to the projected return of more than one million citizens by 2025, the flow of returnees has not only slowed in 2026 but has actually reversed, so that the number of Syrians leaving the country is once again greater than the number who left earlier. Furthermore, all religious and ethnic groups are represented among the new exiles, dispelling any notion that minorities are fleeing the country en masse. Even the Sunnis—who have formed Jolani’s support base—are being forced to flee the country due to the poor performance of the new authorities in Damascus in their economic and social policies, their inability to manage the regional and internal crisis, and despite international support and the lifting of sanctions. Nor are these images encouraging for Lebanon, which is embroiled in a war of occupation by Israel; a new wave of refugees could bring even greater instability to them.

Situation south of Lebanon [12/9/2026]: During the first two weeks of September, the Israeli army continued its low-intensity ground operations: - A. During the second week, the IDF continued demolition work in Mansouri with virtually no expansion of its ground operations there. - B. During the first and second weeks of September, Israeli forces ended up completely expanding their area of operations from the town of Hula to the Litani River. - C. During the second week, Israeli troops managed to establish a foothold on al-Taher Hill after weeks of fighting and the destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure there. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?hl=es&mid=1SrPdIEnbc9pLZIL_nD02rfOGiUuAboc&ll=33.20295652095049%2C35.42279736969284&z=11 ]

Operation “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment” [24/9/2026] 🇾🇪 Over the past three days, the Taiz-Lahij front has stabilized, and the two sides are fighting over a series of positions that change hands periodically, with no signs of any radical change resulting from a local collapse or parallel agreements. Ansarallah recaptured Jabal al-Daif, while the YNA retook Jabal Qarfan, Jabal Hawab, and the hills between Ajram and Duqm al-Ghurab. Meanwhile, on the night of September 23, Sanaa forces launched a test attack along the Al Ashbut and Najd Al-Bard axes, entering the valley through which the Taiz-Aden highway runs. After several hours of sporadic fighting, the troops withdrew to their original positions in the morning. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1k_5mC2oHM9Lj4I5irFA0pkXbqKQ&ll=13.146152373175305%2C44.021115314170075&z=12 ]

Let's be serious for a moment: if you accept this, you have to accept the ridiculous claims about Russian infiltrations 30 km deep that pro-Ukrainian fanatics make in order to deny Russian advances.

I'm sorry, but I don't have to put up with Z fanatics who think this is 100% correct and come here to complain that my maps don't show this.

Есть котёл? МО РФ публикует карту обстановки в Доброполье, чем, фактически, сообщает всем нам, что сформировался второй котёл для ВСУ за последнее время. Первый сейчас зачищается в Харьковской области, второй — в Доброполье. Если/когда заявленное окружение подтвердится, то это будет важно сразу по нескольким причинам. Через Доброполье шёл существенный поток материально-технического обеспечения (боеприпасы, ГСМ, свежие резервы) для частей ВСУ, находившихся западнее Покровска и Мирнограда. Потеря Доброполья физически отсечёт южный фланг группировки противника от северного в этом районе. Вся логистика ВСУ на востоке оказывается разорвана на два изолированных участка без возможности быстрой переброски резервов по рокадам. Не стоит забывать и о том, что Доброполье — последний крупный урбанизированный узел на этом участке перед административной границей с Днепропетровской областью и его потеря если не откроет путь на Днепропетровск как по шоссе, то во всяком случае хотя бы немного его упростит. Кроме того, прорыв через Доброполье на Александровку (всего 20 км на север) позволит обойти Краматорско-Славянскую агломерацию по широкой дуге с юго-запада. Даже если этот план будет реализован хотя бы наполовину, то это ставит под угрозу тылы всей группировки ВСУ в Краматорске и делает бессмысленной многолетнюю систему фортификаций, возведённую вдоль линии Дружковка — Константиновка — Краматорск — Славянск. 📱 VK 💬 MAX 📱 Дзен

The fact that VeSyria—which is responsible for verifying information about Syria (and often proving to be correct)—chose to downplay this individual’s significance by stating, “He wasn’t a member of ISIS; he just liked taking photos with decapitated heads,” leaves much to be desired as a fact-checking outlet, especially for those who frequently rely on its reports.

Don't jump to conclusions, Cedric; let's hear his economic perspective. Perhaps the beheading was the result of a well-reasoned decision to ease the pressure of Ba'athism's unsustainable subsidies and marked the launch of new Islamist neoliberal initiatives during ISIS-controlled Raqqa (They were already visionaries back then).

Sudan Civil War: [19/9/2026]: 🇸🇩 Situation on Kordofan front: During the second and third weeks, the SAF continued its offensive in North Kordofan following the capture of Hamra Al-Waz, taking control of Al-Jamama and advancing into the Al-Murkh area, closing in on the Al-Mahbas area, where the RSF was present. Meanwhile, from Um Garfa, government forces took control of Sharshar, Al Qa'ah, and Tana, while the redeployment of rebel forces continues. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=19IxdgUFhNYyUIXEkYmQgmaYHz6OTMEk&ll=14.588105571611816%2C30.328963754192372&z=9 ]

I don't think Zoka doesn't know how to use Sentinel. There are simply different ways of interpreting the data. Furthermore, Sentinel data from May through October is more difficult to interpret due to the increase in wildfires during those months.

My point of view, but who am I, don't know how to use Sentinel

Regarding the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Shakhove, there is no truth to claims by pro-Ukrainian sources that they have regained territory. The front line is porous and allowed a Ukrainian vehicle to cross country until it was destroyed. It is equally false when these accounts speak of a Russian infiltration into Andrivka from Shakhove; such infiltrations are launched from Novoandriivka, which was recently secured by Russians.

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1662-1668: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Vasylivka front: During the last two weeks, Ukrainian Army has managed to fully recapture the photovoltaic plant and the locality of Pavlivka, while Russian Army has resumed infiltration operations in the center of Stepnohirsk. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=47.57992976497344%2C35.475593222482004&z=12 ]

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1662-1668: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Orikhiv front: During the last week, reinforcements of Ukrainian army have helped to halt the Russian advance in Novopavlivka and Orikhiv. However, this has not been enough to prevent Russian army from consolidating its gains in Novoandriivka and Mala Tokmachka, which both localities have been completely captured, while slight advances have been made in Preobrazhenka. Further east, Russian forces have managed to consolidate their positions in Chervona Krynytsya and Huliaipilske (completely taken too), pushing the front line beyond Ukraine’s first line of defense, entering Novoselivka, and reaching the outskirts of Yehorivka. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=47.56452662195676%2C35.84775508771638&z=11 ]

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1662-1668: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Novomykolaivka & Pokrovskaya fronts: The “kill zone” remains intact and chaotic. In recent weeks, Russian army has managed to carry out infiltration operations from Nove Zaporizhzhya, passing through Radisne, Nechaivka, and Ostapivske, all the way to the outskirts of Andriivka—areas that have supposedly been under firm Ukrainian control for months. On the other hand, the announcement of the Russian capture of Zelena Dibrova—without any photographic or satellite evidence or on-the-ground sources to confirm it—raises serious doubts about the existence of a third Russian advance in that direction, especially given the Ukrainian counterattacks in Huliaipole direction in late August. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=47.87172897206437%2C36.1969877610904&z=11 ]

Regarding the isolation of Dobropillya, it is still too early to speak of a complete cutoff of Ukrainian supply routes to the city. From the north, Russians took control of the 19th & 20th ventilation shafts at the “Almaznaya” mine (48°30'10.5"N 37°04'51.0"E), while Ukrainian army counterattacked in the suburb of Svyatohorivka, reaching the outskirts of Hannivka, where fighting continues. From the south, a wide gray zone prevents either side from consolidating their positions, so infiltrations and operations to eliminate pockets of resistance continue. Further south, northwest of Hryshyne, a shift in the front line was observed for the first time since July, after which Russian troops began entering Hulive after weeks of positional battles. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=48.467422185186344%2C37.05195084307739&z=11 ]