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While fabricated news stories emerge about advances by Aden forces in Marib toward Sanaa, the reality of the situation hits them hard. The YNA suffered heavy losses—both in personnel and equipment—during the fighting in September and October. The attrition from the battles over the hills of the Jawf and Marib deserts is taking its toll on the ability of the PLC and its allies to hold their positions in Lahij once Taiz has fallen, but it also opens the door for Ansarallah to end the fighting in the north by eliminating the last strongholds of the pro-Saudi YNA. 🇾🇪

Honestly, I prefer the old version of the dictator Omar Aladeen to the new Syrian one.

+2

Yemen: Operation “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment” [17/10/2026]: 🇾🇪 On the seventeenth day of the Sana’a forces offensive to capture Taiz Ansarallah captured in the early morning Jabal Dhahih Kahlan and the locality of Kahlan and launched an assault on the last positions of the tribal forces besieged in Dabba and Al-Shaqab. In addition, in the morning, Sanaa forces launched a major assault (ongoing) following the expiration of the second ultimatum, which gave them control of Jabal Han, as well as the villages of Rujmah and Madarāt, allowing them to shift the fighting to Wadi Al-Arin, the Al-Murabba'a neighborhood, the perimeter of Camp Mattar al-Qadim (headquarters of the 35th Armored Brigade), and the vicinity of the “Old Airport” neighborhood. The fighting left behind a large amount of loot following the retreat of the besieged PLC forces. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1k_5mC2oHM9Lj4I5irFA0pkXbqKQ&ll=13.539497661665669%2C43.99361418642284&z=12 ]

Gerasimov's statements are shameful—announcing the capture of two large towns while fierce fighting continues there. Then they'll complain if something similar to what happened in Kupiansk occurs. And men are getting insulted with these declarations while are dying on the battlefield so that the leaders can pin medals on themselves. 🇷🇺🇺🇦

Yemen: Operation “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment” [16/10/2026]: 🇾🇪 On the sixteenth day of the Sana’a forces offensive to capture Taiz Ansarallah focused its efforts on the Sabir Al Mawadim front, taking control of Wadi Arsh and the town of Al-Mu'ayna, and launched an assault on Jabal Dhahih Kahlan, a strategic high ground for the tribal forces under siege in Al-Shaqab and Kahlan. Meanwhile, reinforcements from Sanaa continue to arrive around Taiz, prompting the Saudi Air Force to intensify its airstrikes in the area over the past hours. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1k_5mC2oHM9Lj4I5irFA0pkXbqKQ&ll=13.535617421381685%2C43.98764895357372&z=12 ]

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The STG’s account of Miraj Ural’s arrest for crimes committed against Syrians is merely a cover for the operation. Ural had been wanted by Turkish intelligence services since December 2024 for his terrorist activities in Turkey and, allegedly, for the 2013 Reyhanlı car bombings. Most concerning is the passivity not only of the Lebanese government but also of Hezbollah, for having allowed such an operation to take place on its territory without consent. This passivity or permissiveness toward Turkey and its allies will only embolden future operations and even revive the possibility of an Israeli-style intervention—but in the eastern part of the country—by Damascus. 🇸🇾🇹🇷🇱🇧

Therefore, we in the “Islamic Resistance Front in Syria” affirm the following decisions and statements: First: Condemnation of the infiltration and disinformation campaigns in Lebanon: We warn of the danger that the Lebanese arena may become a permissive environment in terms of security and the media, facilitating the activities of the Damascus regime’s embassy in Beirut, which has gone beyond its diplomatic role to become an active hub for fabricating narratives, persecuting free-thinking individuals, and settling political scores. Second: Exposing suspicious coordination and its malicious use: We reveal the involvement of these embassy-affiliated groups in direct dealings with Lebanese figures and entities loyal to the regime, and the use of this coordination to launch systematic campaigns of persecution targeting, above all, the children and cadres of the dissolved military apparatus, in retaliation for their positions and history. Third: We call for extreme caution and vigilance. We urge all former military cadres and personnel, as well as fighters of the free resistance present on Lebanese territory, to exercise the utmost caution, vigilance, and security awareness; not to be misled by rumors or false narratives; and to take the necessary measures to thwart plans for arrest or elimination. Fourth: Firmness of Position and Principles: These intelligence operations and attempts to betray leaders and tarnish their reputations will not deter the honorable from continuing on their path; rather, they will only strengthen the resolve of the free people to confront the instruments of terrorism, occupation, and treason until rights are fully restored. God is the protector of steadfastness. Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Politburo October 15, 2026

This blatant attack and the accompanying smear campaigns are part of the Turkish occupation’s ongoing attempts to settle its complex historical scores with national symbols and figures of the resistance. The exhaustive research and documentation of Professor Ali Kayali’s long and distinguished career as a key figure in the popular resistance for the liberation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta attest to the fact that, for decades, he stood as a formidable barrier against Turkish ambitions and policies in the region. His activism against the Turkish authorities began in the 1970s, when he led the leftist organization Acilciler. This included his arrest and miraculous escape from Turkish prisons in 1980, when he fled to Syria and reorganized the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Alexandretta Sanjak. This long history of struggle placed him at the top of Turkish intelligence’s “red list,” where he has been targeted for many years.

Statement issued by the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria. In an extremely dangerous security development, Turkish intelligence services carried out a coordinated security operation today that resulted in the arrest and abduction of Professor Ali Kayali (Miraj Ural) and his subsequent disappearance, taking advantage of a compromised security environment and local agents who carried out this despicable attack within Lebanon. This war crime was accompanied by a systematic media disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting him through false accusations. These accusations were never substantiated, and attributing the arrest and responsibility for it to the intelligence services of the Damascus regime was a diversionary tactic, a cover-up of the true culprits, and an attempt to conceal the direct role of the Turkish occupation.

Yemen: Operation “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment” [15/10/2026]: 🇾🇪 On the fifteenth day of the Sana’a forces offensive to capture Taiz a major assault took place from the west of the city after the ultimatum to those under siege expired. Despite this, PLC forces were able to repel the Ansarallah assault, which only managed to capture Surrah and the western part of Jabal Han, a hill currently under dispute. Meanwhile, in the south, Sanaa forces increased pressure on the besieged tribal forces in Kahlan and Al-Shaqab after capturing Al-Najadah. As fighting subsided in the afternoon, a new ultimatum was issued to those under siege, while Ansarallah reinforcements continue to arrive at the perimeter of Taiz city. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1k_5mC2oHM9Lj4I5irFA0pkXbqKQ&ll=13.521797748254615%2C44.00626591064634&z=12 ]

This new strategy follows two objectives: to contain the Russians until the arrival of autumn, when the rain and mud make it difficult for heavy vehicles to advance, forcing them to use secondary roads and significantly slowing down logistics and operations; and, secondly, to create a propaganda image of victory by portraying infiltration zones as captured territory, which has on other occasions resulted in a fresh surge of external aid to Ukraine to enable it to continue the war. Both objectives seems to have been reached now. However, the problem lies in the limitations and costs of this new strategy in the long term. The deployment of these reserve troops alleviates the existing problem of understaffed brigades, helps to hold positions, strengthen defences and reduce the strain on existing units, whilst also dispelling the narrative of a shortage of Ukrainian troops that has been repeated for months. However, the accelerated deployment of troops with little or no experience ultimately loses its saturation effect once there are sufficient numbers of troops on the defending side. This substantially increases the attackers’ casualties (this year the Ukrainians have suffered heavy losses in these local counter-offensives) and leaves a gap in the rear ranks of personnel who are key to resupplying the troops at the front; consequently, in the long term, the overall situation at the front would not only fail to improve but would actually worsen, especially given that this year the Russians have managed to establish drone supremacy across much of the front lines. And the impact is not only military, but also social, as there are currently reservists on the front line who were forcibly conscripted; consequently, a rise in casualties amongst these inexperienced troops – deployed to achieve political and media objectives (without this guaranteeing progress towards a victory, as Zelenskyy seeks) – will have a negative effect by increasing draft evasion and fuelling further social unrest on the streets of Ukraine. 🇺🇦🇷🇺

The Ukrainian rear guard springs into action. 🇺🇦 There has been talk in recent days of Starlink’s temporary restrictions on Ukrainian forces, which affected the Ukrainians’ communications and logistics for a relatively short period. This recent incident highlights the strategic dependence on a system largely controlled by the US and the vulnerability to political or technical decisions, particularly as, unlike Russia, Ukraine is not developing alternatives in the event of a service blockade. Drones have been key to maintaining a relative balance on the front lines, preventing the Russians from making major advances as they did in 2024 and 2025; and with the loss of Starlink for the Russians, the Ukrainians have managed to turn the situation around, halting the Russian advance and even going on the offensive. How has this been possible? The recruitment situation in Ukraine is critical due to a chronic shortage of combat troops, social tensions and reforms aimed at improving incentives and attracting more personnel, both Ukrainian and foreign. Kyrylo Budanov (Head of the Presidential Office) stated in August 2026 that Ukraine cannot mobilise fewer than 30,000 people per month to maintain the current strength of the Armed Forces (estimated at between 880,000 and 1 million personnel). Not all of these forces are deployed on the front line (approximately 250,000–350,000 personnel), whilst the remainder are assigned to logistics, administration, headquarters and the National Guard, Territorial Defence, training, medical recovery or support roles. In fact, barely a third of those mobilised each month actually reach the front line. Theoretically, this would allow the rotation rate to be maintained and troops to recover over time, although in the long term the situation would generally worsen for the Ukrainian side and, of course, it would not allow them to launch counter-attacks on more than one front. December 2025 saw a substantial shift in this dynamic, with a higher proportion of troops from the rear being sent to the front lines. With Mykhailo Fedorov as the new minister in January 2026 and Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander-in-chief, it was decided to send part of this reserve of soldiers – who had little experience or combat skills – to the front to overwhelm the Russian forces, which were already stretched thin, through infiltration operations to force their withdrawal, in this way, the experienced units are tasked with clearing the rear and securing the abandoned Russian positions whilst the infiltrations by the reserves continue to force the Russians to focus on them and abandon any counter-attack. The most notable aspect of this strategy is that it has been carried out under a defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who is an advocate of modernisation and the supremacy of drones (followed by next minister Yevhenii Khmara). And even following Syrskyi’s dismissal in July by Mykhailo Drapatyi—who is apparently inclined to minimise casualties—this strategy has not only continued but has been strengthened, alongside greater decentralisation of management, increased autonomy for commanders and the extension of rotation periods (this has led to an increase in the number of reservists at the front over the last two to three months). The results have been evident on several fronts: - Dnipropetrovsk and southern Donetsk, where the Ukrainians have managed to reverse many of the Russian advances made in 2025 in the former oblast and have recaptured the town of Komar. - Stalling Russian offensive capabilities in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and east of Kramtorsk and Sloviansk, forcing a Russian withdrawal around the waterway (due to Drapatyi’s extensive rotations). - The repulsion of the Russian offensive in Lyman and the surrounding area (though not Operation Vivaldi, carried out by experienced Ukrainian troops). - The maintenance of the pockets east of the Oskil and south of Kupiansk.

They need to be consistent; they cannot criticise the mentally deranged members of NAFO when they themselves display the same stubbornness when it comes to Russian news. 🇷🇺🇺🇦

Criticism from pro-Russian fanatics shows no sign of abating, but the reality of events constantly puts them in their place. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the last localities in the Kharkiv ‘pocket’ have been captured. However, it will still take at least another two or three weeks before it is fully taken. But that’s no problem; as far as they’re concerned, the Russian army never retreats and everything the Ministry of Defence says is true. 🇷🇺🇺🇦

It also debunks one of the beliefs that continues to persist in analyses of this war. Even I have held this belief, and I was surprised to realise this afterwards. 🇷🇺🇺🇦

After speaking to people in Ukraine (not just Russian soldiers), we now have a clearer picture of the Russian retreat over the past few weeks. I’ll talk about it tomorrow. For goodness’ sake, this war must end soon. And to think there are people who are still inciting it... 🇺🇦🇷🇺

It is far too early to speak of an imminent capture of Dobropillya town by the Russian army, but it is incorrect to refer to these as mere infiltrations. Russian forces are currently building up their troops on the outskirts and in the outlying districts of the town, in preparation for a subsequent major assault on the centre of Dobropillya. They do not wish to repeat the mistakes made at Lyman. Ukrainian forces are few in number within the town, but as there is no siege in place (contrary to what the Russian Ministry of Defence erroneously claims), the Ukrainian command continues to send troops to halt the Russian advance. Consequently, Russian troops are moving further west and from the north to establish a siege by cutting off the roads leading into Dobropillya and, in a manner similar to what happened in Kostiantynivka, to force a Ukrainian withdrawal. 🇺🇦🇷🇺

Yemen: Operation “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment” [14/10/2026]: 🇾🇪 On the fourteenth day of the Sana’a forces’ offensive to capture Taiz, there were hardly any changes in control of the territory, with the notable exception of Ansarallah’s capture of the Al-Awat area, which has tightened the siege on tribal forces allied with the PLC in Al-Najadah, Kahlan & Al-Shaqab. Meanwhile, a tense calm persists on the other fronts, whilst large reinforcements from the Sanaa forces (including some of the new spoils of war obtained on the coast) continue to arrive at the gates of Taiz, awaiting the expiry of the three-day deadline granted to those under siege to surrender their positions and be evacuated to Aden. Once the ultimatum has expired, a major assault on the city is expected; the city is currently being fortified with barricades and trenches in the streets. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1k_5mC2oHM9Lj4I5irFA0pkXbqKQ&ll=13.52610443840159%2C44.0105654866624&z=12 ]