What are U.S. extended deterrence options in the Indo-Pacific, assuming the capability and credibility are sufficient to deter an indigenous nuclear weapon, which would come with great fiscal and political cost? Options could include: - Forward base air-launched nuclear weapons, or at least demonstrate the ability to do in a crisis through exercises. These exercises were included in the Obama NPR but never executed. - Continue bomber demonstrations via bomber task force missions, including B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s, and when available the B-21. - Expand the number and type of theatre-based systems that would be deployed by U.S. forces on U.S. platforms to the region. Should the PNIs be reversed for surface ships as well as fast-attack submarines? - Continue extended deterrence dialogues to ensure Indo-Pacific allies view US extended deterrence both politically and militarily credible. - Conduct exercises with Korea and Australia to understand the application of conventional support to nuclear forces. What might Indo-Pacific allies do to support US extended deterrence, ensure that it remains a U.S. priority, and is seen as credible by allies and adversaries? Options could include: - Commit to financial support for forward-deployed nuclear systems, such as base security and support, to encourage the United States to deploy nuclear weapons on their territories either permanently or in the event of a crisis. - Fund U.S. nuclear weapons modernization for use in the Indo-Pacific theatre in exchange for an assured U.S. political commitment to extended deterrence. - Urge the United States to re-deploy nuclear weapons on Guam. - Conduct regional exercises of US dual-capable aircraft. - Consider participation in DCA missions with the United States supplying the nuclear delivery vehicle in a crisis. - Indo-Pacific allies should clearly identify what options they would want for a deterrent tailored specifically to their threat picture. Whatever the United States and its Indo-Pacific agree upon, these options must be seen as credible by China, North Korea, and Russia on the one hand, but not as destabilizing on the other. https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/news-and-insight/extended-nuclear-deterrence-what-might-the-future-hold/