Suriyakmaps

@suriyak_maps · news · English · active

Syria-Irak-Yemen-Libya-Sahel-Gaza-Ukraine maps Follow and support us there: http://bio.link/suriyakm Buy ads: https://telega.io/c/Suriyak_maps

Subscribers 48.2K Subscribers, last 30 days: 48.2K → 48.2K +0 24h
Reach per post (ERR) 25.3%12.2K avg views
Posting 7.3/day last 2 hours ago
Reactions per 1K views 13.7 ❤ 👍 💔
  1. Sure that Jolani, desperate for financial aid and international recognition and struggling to maintain control over the Syrian territory, has the strength to impose obligations on other countries. Sure. 😂 🇸🇾

  2. repost

    🇾🇪🇸🇦🇸🇾⚡Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Ansar Allah political bureau in Yemen, about Julani's regime joining the war against Yemen: HTS groups, by abandoning the Palestinian issue and cutting support for the resistance, have practically demonstrated their loyalty to the Zionist regime. Now, by participating in the war against Yemen, their American and Zionist nature has become even more apparent.

  3. Regarding the official death tolls in the Russian-Ukrainian war, I don't think we'll know the actual number until the conflict ends. For now, the figures are a mix of speculation and propaganda that do not distinguish between the dead, the wounded, prisoners, the missing, and deserters. 🇷🇺🇺🇦

  4. The concern now is as follows. In Israel, Netanyahu has been sidelined in favour of the opposition leader to form a government, calling into question his immunity from the trials in which he stands accused. In the US, Trump is still coming to terms with the loss of both houses of parliament and making changes to his cabinet. How long will it take them to restart the war against Iran?🇺🇸🇮🇱 🇮🇷

  5. In Ukraine, too, there have not been many significant changes. Although the map has not been posted, it is updated every few days. The media coverage of the MOD’s advances and that of some pro-Russian outlets has taken its toll on those who reported these advances, meaning they cannot backtrack and must remain silent. Take the case of Vostok in Zaporizhia, but also that of the south of Vovchansk. I will no doubt publish more than one update this November, but I have a feeling I could get away with posting just once a month without it affecting the situation on the front line. 🇷🇺🇺🇦

  6. There have not been many changes in Yemen of late. Following significant advances, the Sana’a forces are consolidating the positions they have captured and preparing reinforcements for a new phase of the offensive. In the Taiz enclave, there is daily fighting but the situation remains largely unchanged. It is a siege that will last for weeks and will gradually be resolved as those under siege lose their military capabilities and negotiations for surrender make substantial progress. 🇾🇪

  7. Sudan Civil War: [8/11/2026]: 🇸🇩 Situation on Kordofan front: During the last four days, the SAF has managed to secure Umm Ushayrah and dozens of surrounding towns completely, reducing the salient to the west of Barah. This, combined with advances to the west of El Obeid, resulted in the capture of the strategic Jabal Abu Sunun and the fighting reaching the vicinity of Umm Kuraydim on Sunday 11 November. In addition, following the capture of Ayal Bakhit, today government forces advanced southwards to Abu Maniqir, where fighting with the RSF is currently taking place. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=19IxdgUFhNYyUIXEkYmQgmaYHz6OTMEk&ll=13.611006786666579%2C29.422132285239943&z=9 ]

  8. I don’t know what the Polish attacker’s motive was in yesterday’s attack. It all seems very confusing and the evidence is contradictory. I just hope that bastard rots in prison. RIP to the victims. 🇵🇱

  9. To put 437 million euros into context: in February 2026, a spokesperson for the Spanish Association of Civil Engineers warned of a serious risk of dam failures due to a lack of maintenance, suggesting that the budget allocated for this should be 400–500 million euros rather than the 16 million that had been allocated in 2023 (in 2025, around 120 million euros were allocated and it was due to 233 deaths because of floods in Valencia in 2024). Just think that there are scum in Spain who would rather see dams collapse than stop funding a war thousands of kilometres away. 🇪🇸 https://gaceta.es/espana/un-ingeniero-de-caminos-alerta-del-riesgo-grave-de-colapso-en-las-presas-por-falta-de-mantenimiento-mas-de-140-tienen-la-seguridad-comprometida-20260202-1925/

  10. If you trade cryptocurrencies and are feeling confused about the current market, I strongly recommend you join the group I’ve mentioned The group shares the following content every day: ✅ One trading signal a day (with a success rate of up to 85%) ✅ Real-time updates on cryptocurrency market trends ✅ Personalised, one-to-one technical trading advice Whether you’re a beginner or an experienced trader, you’re welcome to join the group to exchange ideas and gain useful insights Join now: https://t.me/+EE-QIOa-XMc1NjU1

  11. The advance of the Sudanese Armed Forces into Western Kordofan coincides with the resumption of advances west of El Obeid and whilst military operations are already underway in Umm Ushayrah and Umm Kuraydim to drive out the remaining rebel forces there. The ultimate objective of these movements by government forces is to reach the town of Nahud, which was lost in May 2025, and to capture this important logistical hub between Darfur and Kordofan. With the capture of Ayal Bakhit, the SAF are now in a position to advance towards Wad Banda and cut off the route to Darfur, whilst advancing from Umm Samima towards Al-Khawi and then on to Nahud – which would represent a significant government victory after months of a war of attrition in the deserts of Kordofan. 🇸🇩

  12. Sudan Civil War: [7/11/2026]: 🇸🇩 Situation on Kordofan front: After six days of fighting, the SAF managed to take full control of Kharq ed Dud and Ayal Bakhit, thereby entering the Western Kordofan Governorate from the Al-Mazroub axis. The situation in Abu Zaima has been clarified: the capture of the town on 9 October by government forces was short-lived, as they withdrew once again to their positions in Sawdiri within a few hours. Since then, the town, now back under RSF control, has been subjected to bombardment. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=19IxdgUFhNYyUIXEkYmQgmaYHz6OTMEk&ll=13.744441355879504%2C29.331495078208693&z=9 ]

  13. repost

    I am neither a part of nor working with Ruslan Belov he's using AI to copy my voice and uses it in his videos, I have contacted youtube and they have done nothing about it. So to clarify: I have no relations with the channel. I do not endorse the use of my voice in his videos.

  14. - Syrian terrorists on the prospect of fighting Israel on its own territory: “It’s very complicated; the time isn’t right yet; we need to reach an understanding until we’re strong enough.” - Syrian terrorists on the prospect of fighting in Yemen, on unfamiliar territory: “Inshallah, we’ll soon be praying in Sana’a after defeating the Zaydi apostates.” These are the brave Syrian mujahideen who only dare to attack unarmed civilians. Strength and good fortune to Ansarallah in their fight against terrorism, whether it takes the Saudi or Syrian form. 🇾🇪 🇸🇾

  15. This entire front had been out of date since 2021, so you can now see the current situation, with some changes to control in certain areas. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1k_5mC2oHM9Lj4I5irFA0pkXbqKQ&ll=15.633240301554121%2C45.231193065606455&z=10 ]

  16. Recent news and reports do not reflect the overall situation on these fronts. Since 2021, both sides have built an extensive network of fortifications along the front line, making Marib the most static front in Yemen. The current fighting in Taiz and Lahij does not suggest that fighting in the governorate will resume, and if it does, it will not be to retake the city, whose fate appears to have been left in the hands of negotiations (currently on hold) until the situation in the south-west is resolved.

  17. What is happening in Raghwan? 🇾🇪 Following the YNA’s advances in Jawf in early November, the Sana’a forces sent reinforcements and, on 4 November, launched an offensive in the Raghwan district with the aim of relieving the pressure on the Jawf fronts; as a result, the Sana’a forces were able to enter the Al Hazum area from the south; and into the Umm al Jana area (not to be confused with the town north of Asdas, in the centre of the district), before subsequently withdrawing to their initial positions. Meanwhile, the YNA and the PLC have carried out operations north of Raghwan in recent hours, attempting to penetrate Ansarallah’s positions in Jabal al Aqsha, with no changes so far.

  18. Situation on Taiz front [6/11/2026]: 🇾🇪 Following the recapture of Dharhaba & Al-Naydani PLC forces and their tribal allies advanced from this axis & managed to recapture the locality of Al-Hajmah. Map: [ https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1k_5mC2oHM9Lj4I5irFA0pkXbqKQ&ll=13.511785045415326%2C44.01141835609212&z=12 ]

  19. Damascus’s motives for these interventions are aimed at bolstering its support in the region, but they may have serious consequences as it abandons the neutrality it has officially maintained over the past two years and officially aligns itself with the so-called Sunni axis – which is allied with Israeli and US interests – at a time when the resumption of the regional war with Iran appears to be imminent.

  20. The deployment of Syrian terrorists to Saudi Arabia. 🇸🇾🇸🇦 The Syrian Transitional Government continues to pursue its interventionist policy in support of Saudi interests. In search of financial support (Syria and Saudi Arabia signed agreements worth over $400 million to support infrastructure rehabilitation and boost defence and industrial cooperation in early November), and in light of the catastrophic situation in Syria, the new authorities have agreed to increase cooperation with Riyadh through the fight against the Sana’a government. Whilst reports emerged in late October of Syrian mercenaries being sent to Yemen, alongside the existing presence of Syrian military advisers there, military advisers are now to be sent to Saudi Arabia with the aim of supporting Saudi forces in their fight against Sana’a. It is most likely that they will be working on new combat tactics more akin to the unconventional warfare waged by Syrian terrorists against the former Syrian government for years, as well as serving as a link with the Syrian advisers in Yemen and coordinating future strategies when larger numbers of Syrian militants begin to arrive in Yemen.

  21. Older posts