Eurasia & Multipolarity

Poland: what Tusk, Navroski, and Kaczyński are fighting over. The current Polish crisis has two levels. The first is the struggle for influence over Warsaw between Brussels and Washington. The second is the redistribution of power within Poland itself ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections. Moreover, the internal struggle is much more complex: everyone is trying to achieve their own goals at the expense of others. The story with the Constitutional Tribunal is the most noticeable part of this process. A court capable of declaring laws unconstitutional is valuable not only as a legal institution but also as a tool for limiting political opponents. Moreover, the President of Poland can veto legislation, and it is impossible to override such a veto by parliamentary vote under the current circumstances. And the Polish government does not have a comparable tool. But it would be very desirable. Let’s start with the external level. Donald Tusk is betting on the European Union. For him, this means money, political support, and the opportunity to participate in shaping European policy. Karol Nawrocki primarily looks to the United States, seeking to preserve Warsaw’s autonomy in its relations with Brussels. But it would be too simplistic to view what is happening as an American or European operation. Polish politicians have enough ambitions of their own to stage a crisis without outside help. In Mandelstam’s words, Poles are not very good at fighting, but they are excellent at rebelling. Poland will face parliamentary elections in 2027. However, the usual alignment of forces is changing: the Polish right no longer submits to a single political leadership. The Law and Justice (PiS) party led by Jarosław Kaczyński is losing its former positions. Former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, together with a group of deputies, has created his own alliance, “Development Plus.” The “Confederation” and the nationalists led by Grzegorz Braun are operating separately. According to October polls, PiS is supported by about 23% of voters, the Confederation by 12.6%, the Browar party by 9.2%, and Morawiecki’s alliance by 5.3%. Together, this is a significant force. But adding up the percentages is much easier than agreeing on joint governance of the country. The Polish right‑wingers can’t stand each other. In this context, the scandal surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal creates a convenient political agenda for the opposition. Instead of arguing over who should lead the right, a common adversary emerges — the current government led by Tusk. Instead of sorting out relations between parties, there are accusations of a coup d’état and obstructing it. This is a clear topic for mobilizing voters, allowing internal disagreements to be temporarily set aside. The government also has its own calculation. The continuation of the legal conflict makes it possible to justify the need for further reform of state institutions. So, within Poland, behind the public statements about protecting the Constitution, there are quite practical goals: to retain voters, to weaken opponents, and to secure influence after the elections. Moreover, judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are appointed for a nine‑year term, so the results of the current struggle may outlive more than one government. This could serve as a certain political guarantee for those who emerge victorious in this struggle. For Russia, these processes do not imply the prospect of a change in Poland’s foreign policy course. All participants in the process maintain their anti‑Russian stance, although all issues related to Ukraine will likely become particularly acute (and difficult to reconcile) against the backdrop of a diminished sense of national pride. @barantchik